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Abstract: The theory of essential definitions is a fundamental anti-sceptic element of the
Aristotelian-Avicennian epistemology. In this theory, when we distinguish the genus and the spe-
cific differentia of a given essence we thereby acquire a scientific understanding of it. The aim of
this article is to analyse systematically the sceptical reasons, arguments and conclusions against
real definitions of three major authorities of twelfth-century Arabic philosophy: Faḫr al-Dīn al-
Razī, Šihab al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī and Abu l-Barakat al-Baġdadī. I focus on showing how their ref-
utation of our capacity to provide essential definitions of things is rooted in their semantic theory:
we only know things under certain descriptions which are identical to the meanings of the words
that we use to refer to them, yet these descriptions do not capture the essences of things in them-
selves. The best result one can achieve with Aristotelian-Avicennian scientific definitions is a
“nominal definition”. With this, Razī, Suhrawardī and Abu l-Barakat will put some serious episte-
mic limitations on our capacity to attain scientific knowledge of things, at least as Aristotle and
Avicenna would have it.
Keywords: meaning, semantics, definition, essence
WHEN WE LOOK AT THE history of Arabic philosophy, we might suggest that medie-
val Arabic philosophy lacks any sceptical element. This suggestion would ground
itself in the fact that when one looks at the so-called “classical” period of Arabic
philosophy (roughly from the ninth to the eleventh century CE), one can observe
that Neoplatonism and Peripateticism strongly dominate the mainstream philo-
sophical schools of the period. As scepticism is entirely alien to both Neoplato-
nism and Peripateticism, the reasoning goes, there ought to be no wonder that it
finds no place in classical Arabic philosophy. The so-called “post-classical”
period, in its turn, is largely determined by the inheritance of Abu ʿAlī b. Sīna
(known in the West as Avicenna, d. 1037), whose epistemology Dag Hasse
(2013) has recently characterized as “optimistic”. This characterization is in no
way an exaggeration. In order to secure our knowledge, Avicenna emphasizes the
complete reliability of our own capacity to abstract conceptual forms from sensi-
ble particulars and the assistance that we receive from the transcendent epistemic
and ontological principle called the Active Intellect. In fact, in doing so, Avi-
cenna overdoes his job of securing knowledge: according to different
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interpretations, empirical abstraction and illumination from the Active Intellect
are both presented as sufficient grounds for epistemic certainty. This two-fold
grounding has led to recent, rival interpretations of Avicenna’s epistemology in
contemporary scholarship (Black, 2005; Gutas, 2012; Hasse, 2013; Black, 2014;
Alpina, 2014). But regardless of whichever interpretation is correct, one would
not expect to come across sceptical doubts on the limitations of our knowledge in
this period, given Avicenna’s optimistic epistemology and his influence on the
later Arabic philosophical tradition.1
Though Avicenna is an important determining factor for post-classical Arabic
philosophy, this does not mean that his theories were uncritically accepted. Being
a good Aristotelian, Avicenna crowns his epistemological optimism with the the-
ory of essential definitions. In this theory, when we distinguish the genus and the
specific differentia of a given essence we thereby acquire a scientific understand-
ing of it, the most famous example being the definition of the essence of human
as “rational animal”. Despite this theory of essential definitions being highly anti-
sceptical, it provoked much scepticism in the later tradition. Several studies
(Falaturi, 1969; Ibrahim, 2013; Özturan, 2018) have already noted that the influ-
ential twelfth-century Arabic philosopher, Faḫr al-Dīn al-Razī (d. 1210), devel-
oped a critique of precisely this Aristotelian-Avicennian theory of acquisition of
the conceptualization of things through their essential definitions. Other studies
(e.g., Ziai, 1990) showed that another influential figure, Šihab al-Dīn al-
Suhrawardī (d. 1191), developed his own refutation of Avicennian essential defi-
nitions roughly at the same time as Razī. This simultaneity is no coincidence. As
I will show in this article, Razī and Suhrawardī have a common source in their
rebellion against the Aristotelian-Avicennian thesis whose central tenet is that we
grasp the essences of extramental things by providing their scientific definitions
in terms of genus and species. Razī’s and Suhrawardī’s predecessor on this issue
is Abu l-Barakat al-Baġdadī (d. 1165) – a highly influential and independent
thinker from the first half of the twelfth century, whose importance, however, has
been largely neglected in the scholarship.
The aim of this article is to analyse systematically the sceptical reasons, argu-
ments and conclusions against real definitions in Razī, Suhrawardī and Abu
l-Barakat. I will focus on showing how their refutation of our capacity to provide
essential definitions of things is rooted in their semantic theory: we only know
1 In this very rough summary, I omit the mystical tradition of Arabic philosophy. Of course, mystics
famously deny the reliability of philosophical and scientific knowledge in favour of direct mystical expe-
rience. Remarkably, however, even mysticism insists that one can know the true realities of things. It just
happens in a different way. In any case, a study of mystical scepticism lies beyond the scope of this
article.
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things under certain descriptions which are identical to the meanings of the words
that we use to refer to them; yet these descriptions do not capture the essences of
things in themselves. The best result one can achieve with Aristotelian-
Avicennian scientific definitions is a “nominal definition” of the referentially
opaque meaning of a notion – in analytical parlance, of an intension – and not of
essences of things in themselves. With this, Razī, Suhrawardī and Abu l-Barakat
– quite against the supposition about the absence of scepticism in Arabic philoso-
phy – will put some serious epistemic limitations on our capacity to attain scien-
tific knowledge of things, at least as Aristotle and Avicenna would have it.
My presentation of twelfth-century scepticism against Peripatetic scientific defini-
tions will proceed in the following way: first, I will present Razī’s criticism of defini-
tions on the basis of Meno’s paradox and the paradox of analysis, as well as reassess
his conclusion that the conceptualizations of things are never acquired and that all def-
initions are nominal. Second, I will present Suhrawardī’s refutation of essential defini-
tions, how it is connected to Suhrawardī’s metaphysics, and what his conclusion, that
all Peripatetic definitions are nominal, in fact means. Third, I will present their com-
mon source, Abu l-Barakat’s move to limit the task of definitions. We will see that
Abu l-Barakat is led to conclude that all definitions are nominal due to his semantic
theory of nominal reference. In conclusion, I will speculate a little on how Avicenna
himself paved the way for Razī, Suhrawardī and Abu l-Barakat’s critiques.
1. Razī: Meno’s Paradox and Nominal Definitions
As has been briefly noted already by Falaturi (1969), Razī develops his refutation
of the Avicennian theory of definitions with an eye towards his Ashʿarite ethical
doctrines. His main goal is to prove that no human knowledge is acquired
through our own volition; rather, all knowledge happens automatically. As our
acts depend on our motivations, which in their turn depend on our beliefs, we are
thus not free even in our beliefs, let alone our actions (Razī, Inquiries,
9.102–106). By showing the incoherence of the intentional acquisition of defini-
tions, Razī means to secure his Ashʿarite conviction in human determinism. So,
why are we not free in our extent of knowledge of what things are?
In most of his works, Razī formulates his doctrine in the following way: no
conceptualizations (tas:awwurat) of things are acquired (muktasab); all of them
are necessary/immediate (ḍarurī) and evident (badīhī).2 This opposition relies on
2 Relevant discussion may be found in the Summary, Logic (101–118), Substance of Beliefs (81–85),
Inquiries (9.102–106), Summit of Reason (103–116) and Perfect Treatise (19–20); cf. Sign Posts (13).
Razī may adhere to the position of an influential Ashʿarite scholar, ʿAbd al-Malik al-Ğuwaynī (d. 1085);
on this, see Eichner (2009, p. 182).
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two epistemological doctrines. First, it plays on the distinction between conceptu-
alization (tas:awwur) and assent (tas:dīq), a widely accepted distinction in Arabic
logic (see, e.g., Black, 2008). Conceptualization traditionally means possessing or
mentally entertaining a concept, such as “human”, along with its intensional con-
tent – that is, “rational animal”. The intensional content is included in the notion
of human and therefore thinking “human” and thinking “rational animal” is just
one and the same act of thought. Assent in its turn means assenting to the truth
of a proposition like “human is rational animal”. Conceptualizations do not imply
any predication.3 They are simply ideas, concepts in the mind. By contrast, the
act of assent implies providing a proposition that we claim to either correspond
or not correspond with reality.
The second epistemological doctrine of Razī’s thesis is the distinction between
knowledge that is acquired through investigation (ʿilm na .zarī) and immediate
knowledge (ʿilm .darurī). This distinction was elaborated in the classical period of
Islamic philosophical theology, known under the name of kalam (see,
e.g., Baqillanī, Introduction, 26–27). A thorough study of the opposition between
these two notions still remains a desideratum for scholarship, and lies beyond the
scope of this article. Let me just focus on Razī. Given the ethical background of
the freedom of belief, we ought to interpret the opposition as follows: acquired
knowledge is the knowledge that is acquired through voluntary investigation. I do
not know what the essence of humans is. I voluntarily decide to address it, I pro-
vide an analysis, and I end up with a notion of human as rational animal. By con-
trast, immediate knowledge means that I know what “human” is just because it
has presented itself to me in a certain way. Razī distinguishes two sub-classes of
this type of knowledge: sensibles and non-sensibles. Sensibles include such
examples as colours, sounds, tastes, etc. Non-sensibles, which are described as
“arising from the inborn nature (fiṭra) of soul” or “of the intellect”, include such
psychological states as knowledge or power as well as our emotions and passions,
such as pain or pleasure, and the primary intelligibles, such as existence, unity,
necessity, etc. (Substance of Beliefs, 84.5–9; Summit of Reasoning, 1.118–119;
Razī, Summary, Logic, 109). None of these requires investigation in order that
one grasps the contents of that type of knowledge. They just present themselves
to us, and we immediately know what, e.g., blackness or pain is. In order to avoid
confusion down the road, it is important to note that the notion of immediate
knowledge is not in any way connected to Kantian apriorism, even though
3 Unless we accept the conceptualization of propositions without assenting to them (cf. El Rouayheb,
2016). If this interpretation is correct, propositions are concepts in the mind. Hence, whatever applies to
simple concepts applies equally to propositions (impossibility of spontaneous acquisition, nominal refer-
ence, etc.). I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer and Abdurrahman Mihirig for referring me to this
issue.
© 2020 The Authors. Theoria published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Stifielsen Theoria.
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ʿilm .dar urī does literally mean “necessary knowledge”. After all, according
to Razī, objects of sense-perception definitely belong to this kind of knowl-
edge; they are not acquired by means of any deliberate investigation. How-
ever, according to Kant, objects of sense-perception are not known a priori.
Keeping in mind both the doctrine of conceptualization and acquired knowl-
edge, the following picture emerges: Razī’s point is that we do not know what
things are by intending to acquire that knowledge through analysis; rather, we
immediately and without intent encounter them and automatically learn what they
are. In other words, there is no spontaneity (this, in the Kantian sense;
cf. McDowell, 1994, p. 5) in our concept-acquisition. The knowledge of things is
given to us.4 Thus Razī at least denies that conceptualization is a case of acquired
knowledge (I will address the problem of assent later); in which case, knowing
what human is would instead be “immediate” and so fall under the second class
of knowledge, most probably under the sub-class of sensibles (that is, insofar as
we know other people; see The Commentary on the Elements of Philosophy,
1.73.19).
It is important to understand that conceptualization for Razī is not just some
random mental entertainment of concepts. As Razī puts it in the Summit of Rea-
son (1.103.8–9), conceptualization means “intellection of true realities” and is
synonymous with (re)cognition (maʿrifa). In the parlance of intentionality, these
formulations imply that conceptualization has an “aboutness” or directedness
towards the extramental realities of things. It is conceptualization of things, not
conceptualization of concepts. Acquisition of concepts is a spontaneous attempt
to understand the essences of things in themselves. Acquiring concepts is con-
nected with another notion, taʿrīf, an established notion in Arabic logic that can
be translated as “making known”, “to grasp” or even “definition”. For the pur-
poses of this article, I translate it as “making understood/understanding” because
of the meaning that Avicenna ascribes to it in his Easterners. There, he explains
that taʿrīf is an act when someone intends to conceptualize something only “if he
is aware of it” (Easterners, Logic, 29.2–3). Elsewhere he uses the notion of taʿrīf
interchangeably with “providing understanding for an essence” (tafhīm al-ḏat;
37.11). The best among the three translations for taʿrīf is therefore “understand-
ing”. “Making known” is misleading because for Avicenna one is already aware
of the object of knowledge (this aspect will play a crucial role in the discussion
of Meno’s paradox). “Definition” is also wrong because, as we will see, other
4 In his 2013 paper, Ibrahim suggests that Razī’s goal is to replace “noumenal” with “phenomenal”
knowledge. I am not sure whether I understand what Ibrahim means by this. If he means that Razī is a
phenomenalist and argues that we cannot know things in themselves or if Ibrahim means replacing all
conceptual knowledge with the sensible, I think it goes too far, although I agree that this question needs
further discussion.
© 2020 The Authors. Theoria published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Stifielsen Theoria.
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kinds of understanding also fall under taʿrīf. Rather, taʿrīf (if it is not deficient)
means that one acquires a full understanding of the object of which one has
already been aware. For instance, if one performs taʿrīf of something through def-
inition (ḥadd), one acquires a conceptualization of it (Easterners, Logic, 40.19).
Razī, in contrast to Avicenna, denies such taʿrīf. Razī’s refutation of the acquisi-
tion of concepts and of taʿrīf thus means that one cannot perform a deliberate
inquiry into the essences of things and thereby arrive at a full understanding of
them. Rather, in Razī’s view, one directly and immediately knows things in them-
selves as they are given to our perception.
I shall return to formulating Razī’s goal in refuting Avicenna’s concept acquisi-
tion theory at the end of this section. For now, I would like to first turn to his
arguments, since they help clarify Razī’s objectives. Razī has two main arguments
in favour of his position. His first argument is nothing else than Meno’s paradox.
This paradox targets the issue of intentional acquisition of concepts in general.
His second argument is directed specifically against the Aristotelian-Avicennian
theory of concept acquisition through formulating scientific definitions or
descriptions.
Meno’s paradox takes on the following formulation in Razī:
[T1] If one is not aware (mašʿuran) of the object of inquiry, inquiry is impossible. For, if one is
entirely unaware of something, the soul undertakes no inquiry into it. If on the other hand one is
aware of it, inquiry is again impossible, since it is absurd to make something available when it is
already available (al-ḥas:il). If someone says: [the inquirer] is aware of [the object of inquiry] in
some respect or other, I respond: the respect in which he is aware of it is distinct from the respect
in which he is not aware of it. He cannot inquire into the first [respect], since it is [already] avail-
able. Nor can he inquire into the second [respect], since he is absolutely unaware of it. (Substance
of Beliefs, 81.10–82.2)
Razī’s version of Meno’s paradox is a “start paradox” (cf. Plato, Meno,
80d6–10): how can we start inquiring into anything if we do not even know into
what we are inquiring – that is, if we are completely unaware of the object of
inquiry? How can I inquire into the essence of humans if I have no idea that such
an object exists at all? In other words, if one is not even aware of a certain subject
of inquiry, one cannot do anything about that subject: neither inquire into it, nor
tell anything about it at all. On the contrary, if I am already aware of the subject
of inquiry, why would I need to inquire into it anymore? I look at humans, I am
aware of them, I designate this subject of my awareness as “humans” as opposed
to “horses”, and so do not need to learn anything more about them.
Razī is perfectly aware of the traditional Aristotelian solution to the paradox,
which was accepted by Avicenna, among others (Marmura, 2009; henceforth
called here “aspects solution”). It states that knowing one aspect of something is
sufficient for a subsequent inquiry into another aspect of that thing. It is enough
© 2020 The Authors. Theoria published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Stifielsen Theoria.
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that I know at least something about the subject “humans” (maybe even not that
they are rational animals, but, for example, that these subjects are two-footed ani-
mals). With this knowledge, Avicenna reasons, I can fix the subject of inquiry
and learn something more about it. Razī disagrees with Avicenna in this regard.
He argues that we would still need to distinguish between the known and the
unknown aspect of a thing. But once one makes the distinction, the paradox
returns: one cannot inquire into the known as it is already known, nor can one
inquire into the unknown because it is absolutely unknown.
In order to understand Razī’s objection, we need to turn to semantics. We
should note that instead of knowledge-related notions, such as “known” and
“unknown” that were traditionally used in Meno’s paradox and in the
Aristotelian-Avicennian solution to it, Razī uses notions of awareness and avail-
ability. In my understanding, Razī’s argument immediately brings us into the
realm of opaque descriptions – that is, intensions or meanings (Fregean Sinn). If I
am aware of humans under the description “two-footed animal”, I do not need to
inquire into it anymore. In fact, whatever I do to this meaning, it will not help me
learn that real humans are better defined as “rational animals”. I was and will
remain completely unaware of the notion of humans as rational animals. One can-
not distinguish between the known and the unknown aspects of meanings and
descriptions because they are formulated according to how we know them. Razī’s
argument against the “aspects solution” fails if one takes his notion of awareness
to be awareness of extramental referents (Fregean Bedeutung). For instance, I can
be aware of the existence of the subject of inquiry “human”. I might refer to it
with the notion “two-footed animal”. Yet I am aware of the subject of the inquiry
not through it being described as “two-footed animal” but rather as such. We
may recall that awareness had already figured in Avicenna’s definition of taʿrīf
(understanding). One is aware of the concrete referent of the name “human” by
referring to it as, e.g., “two-footed animal”; one learns that it is “rational animal”
and thereby acquires new conceptual understanding of the same referent. In
Avicenna’s definition of taʿrīf one is precisely aware of referents; whereas in
Razī’s objection one is aware of referents only insofar as they are described with
meanings. The core of the Aristotelian-Avicennian “aspects solution” consists in
submitting an underlying subject of inquiry, which one can access through differ-
ent meanings (provided they are sufficient for fixing the extension of the name in
question) – both through the known aspect and through the unknown. If one is
aware of the subject of reference as such, it is sufficient for inquiry. If, however,
our awareness does not apply to the referents as such but only insofar as they are
captured by meanings or senses of our notions, then Avicenna’s aspects solution
does not work.
© 2020 The Authors. Theoria published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Stifielsen Theoria.
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Razī’s second argument against grasping extramental essences through the pro-
cess of spontaneous conceptualization is directed explicitly against the
Aristotelian-Avicennian theory of definitions and descriptions. He argues that the
act of conceptualization of an object is limited to the following four ways (Sub-
stance of Beliefs, 82–83; Summit of Reason, 107–108; Razī, Summary, Logic,
101–103):
(1) through itself;
(2) through something intrinsic;
(3) through something extrinsic;
(4) through the combination of intrinsic and extrinsic.
Razī argues that none of these options are possible. The first option is false
because nothing can be grasped through itself. As Özturan (2018) suggested in
his comprehensive analysis of the argument, Razī argues for the falsehood of the
first option on the basis of the Aristotelian-Avicennian axiom that definitions are
provided through something better known. Namely, nothing can be better known
than the thing itself. The second option directly addresses the Aristotelian-
Avicennian theory of definitions. According to this theory, definitions are pro-
vided through discovering the genus and specific differentiae, since both genus
and specific differentiae are intrinsic to the essence of the defined
(Özturan, 2018). According to Özturan, Razī relies on a problematic mereological
assumption, that the sum of a thing’s parts equals the whole. He thereby reduces
the second way to the first. Özturan rightly connects Razī’s refutation of the sec-
ond option with semantics. The argument only works if one remains in the
opaque context of referring to things through meanings rather than operating with
referents as such. If the description of x under the meaning M1 is identical with
that of M2 – as the defined and the definition should be – then learning M1
through M2 makes no sense, or at least should be proclaimed as uninformative.
For instance, I already refer to humans with the meaning “human”. It is therefore
false to say that I learn something more about them through “rational animal”, if
“rational animal” is stated to be identical with “human” on the level of meanings
or definite descriptions. If, however, one operates on the referentially transparent
level of referents as such – as Özturan suggests on behalf of a later author,
Ṭaškuprīzade (d. 1561) – then the identity of “human” and “rational animal” as
the whole and its parts would be strictly extensional. In this case there would be
no harm in it, as the intensions of “human” and “rational animal” would still be
distinct. It would still be possible to understand the referent of “human” as “ratio-
nal animal”. Given that Razī does not entertain this option, his argument func-
tions on the intensional context of grasping things insofar as they are captured by
meanings.
© 2020 The Authors. Theoria published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Stifielsen Theoria.
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Likewise the argument against the third option operates on the level of mean-
ings. Here Razī targets the Peripatetic theory of descriptions (ὑπογραφή/rasm as
opposed to óρισμóς/ḥadd; see Bonelli, 2001). According to Avicenna, as an alter-
native to definitions, one can also make entities understood through their non-
essential properties. For instance, I could make “human” be understood through
the notion “whoever is capable of laughing”. Even though “capacity to laugh” is
not essential to humans, it is their necessary and specific concomitant and there-
fore is sufficient for making their reality understood (e.g., Easterners, Logic,
30.6; 30.7–8). Note that this kind of description is not merely a way of saying at
least something about the subject. Instead, it attempts to capture the subject’s
essence by way of its extrinsic attributes.
Razī argues against conceptualization through scientific descriptions by empha-
sizing that one needs to know that the required properties specifically belong to
the object of understanding. For instance, being odd necessarily applies to both
three and five, but I cannot specifically conceptualize either as “that which is
odd”. Razī argues that I cannot know the specificity of the attribution of a certain
property without first knowing the subject of attribution. Therefore, scientific
understanding through descriptions becomes as circular or uninformative as that
achieved through definitions. A later author, Nas:īr al-Dīn al-Ṭusī (d. 1274), right-
fully diagnoses the problem: if a property is extensionally identical (he calls it
“equal”) to an essence, then we automatically grasp the essence when we grasp
the property (Summary of the Substance of Beliefs, 8.18–9.2). In other words, we
do not need to know that it specifically belongs to the essence; rather, it just so
happens to be specific to the essence and as such allows us to arrive at the under-
standing of that essence. For if it were not specific to the essence, it could not
bring us there. We have, however, seen that Razī does not want to allow this level
of extensional identity into the game. His argument, that one must first know the
subject of attribution before knowing that a certain property belongs to it, implies
that properties directly follow from the meaning with which we refer to the sub-
ject. It follows from the meaning of “human” that they are capable of laughing
(the capacity to laugh is grounded in rationality). Here, the extensional identity of
capacity to laugh and humanity plays no role. Their co-extension is only implied
through the intensional implication of one from the other; if x intensionally
implies y, they are extensionally identical a fortiori. That is why scientific
descriptions are not informative either: we must already know the meaning of
“human” in order to know that “capacity to laugh” is implied by it.
Finally, Razī can quickly reject the fourth option because it simply amounts to
the combination of the second and the third. He can thus now triumph against the
Aristotelian-Avicennian theory of conceptualization. Neither definitions nor
descriptions, the two ways to conceptualize things scientifically, are informative.
© 2020 The Authors. Theoria published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Stifielsen Theoria.
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One can summarize both Razī’s arguments under C. H. Langford’s (1942) notion
of “paradox of analysis”. Razī argues that conceptualization cannot be informa-
tive. We do not extend our knowledge of the essences of things by providing their
definitions or descriptions. Razī’s argument – as the paradox of analysis – is
based on problematizing how one meaning, such as “human”, can be supplied
with additional meaning, such as “rational animal”. If the latter is already con-
tained in the meaning of “human”, then this is not a proper expansion of knowl-
edge. As Razī puts it in the first argument, we cannot grasp anew that which we
have already grasped. As he puts it in the second argument, we cannot grasp a
notion through itself again. Conversely, if the new information is not contained in
the meaning of a thing, then the predication of identity is just false (in the para-
dox of analysis we can only allude to intensional identity).
If we may have doubts about connecting Razī’s arguments with semantics, we
can find decisive support for it in his solution to both arguments. Razī states that
the only way to escape the aforementioned difficulties is to say that definition is
“a detailed analysis (tafs:īl) of that which is signified by a name in an inclusive
way” (Summit of Reason, 113.1–2; Substance of Belief, 84.2; Razī, Summary,
Logic, 106.1–2; Perfect Treatise, 20.23). This is the statement that Ibrahim (2013)
rightfully interpreted as the thesis that all Aristotelian-Avicennian definitions are
merely nominal for Razī. Razī means to say that whatever we do in the process
of defining, we do not amplify our knowledge about the essence of external
objects. Rather we further explicate the meaning of a word which refers to an
already known external object. Explication replaces amplification. I can vaguely
know the meaning of the word “human” insofar that I refer to humans with that
meaning; I then define “human” as “rational animal”. By doing this, I do not
broaden my knowledge about the essence of humans. I only explicate what I had
meant earlier by my notion of “human”. Razī solves Meno’s paradox and the
problems about the circularity of definitions and descriptions on the basis of nom-
inal reference and different levels of explicitness. Having “inclusive signification”
is enough for fixing the subject of inquiry, so that Meno can no longer say that
one is not aware of it at all. The distinction between different levels of explicit-
ness is sufficient to avoid circularity: one does not grasp “human” through itself
when one explicates it as “rational animal”. Again, both the problems and the
solutions that Razī provides for us function solely on the level of meaning or
intension. The problem was explaining how we can depart from one understood
meaning of an object and arrive at another. The solution for Razī is that we do
not. Instead, we have one and the same meaning but just on different levels of
explicit understanding: “It amounts to the specification of a conceptualized reality
by way of a detailed conceptualization” (Summit of Reason, 114.12).
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Razī’s interpretation of conceptualization as the act of nominal definition, and
his understanding of nominal definition as the explication of certain postulated
meanings, have their roots in Avicenna’s theory of nominal definitions:
[T2] That which is called “definition” is either in respect to the name (al-ism) or in respect to the
essence (al-ḏat). That which is in respect to the name is a detailed (mufas:s:il) account which sig-
nifies the meaning of a name according to its use, whereas that which is in respect to the essence
is a detailed account which unfolds an essence in terms of its quiddity. Whenever somebody uses
a notion (laf .z), if he chooses an expression for the meaning which he intends, its defining is up to
him, so that there is no quarrel with him at all, unless he deviates from what he intends in one of
the ways which we will mention [later on]. As for when he composes meanings as he wants and
then says about the sum: “that is what I intend when I use the notion”, then this is the definition
of this notion – if he does not make a mistake in the composition among those you will hear about
[later on]. Yet [this definition] would not be of such a kind that if you attached some additional
meaning (be it specific for what one has composed or not) to what you posited, you could claim
that the composed plus the addition is the meaning of the notion which has been defined earlier,
so that one could say that it is identical to it. (Easterners, Logic, 34.6–14)
Avicenna distinguishes in this passage between two types of definitions: nomi-
nal and real. When one provides the nominal definition, one defines whichever
meaning one intended to define. It follows that there can be neither mistakes nor
arguments about nominal definitions. If I define the intended meaning of humans
as “two-footed animals”, one cannot argue against me by saying that there are
other two-footed animals, such as birds, and hence this definition fails to identify
the essence of humans. No, I did not even intend to identify the essence of
humans! I was just saying that the meaning of a certain word that I call “humans”
is “two-footed animals”. You may call “humans” the entities that are “rational
animals”, as it pleases you, but then our debate is merely verbal. From this, in its
turn, follows that I cannot even debate with myself about the nominal definition
of humans. If I mean “two-footed animals” by “humans”, I cannot add another
sense to it, like “rational” and have a different definition of “humans” as “two-
footed rational animals”. The reason is that this new definition will be a definition
of another notion, call it “humans*”, and not of “humans”. In this way Avicenna
rejects the idea of amplifying nominal definitions – a feature that is so central for
understanding Razī’s theory of conceptualization. Although the theory of
meaning-explication is not yet developed in Avicenna (we will see in section 3
that Razī rather inherits it from Abu l-Barakat), the notion of “detailed analysis/
account” is already there: nominal definitions only provide a detailed analysis of
meanings. Razī also faithfully follows the Avicennian thesis that there can be nei-
ther quarrels nor arguments about nominal definitions (Summit of Reason,
115–16; Razī, Summary, Logic, 111).
There is, however, one important difference between Razī and Avicenna. Avi-
cenna also recognizes the possibility of real definitions in this passage. Instead of
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explicating a meaning, we can make an essence understood, that is, conceptualize
what it is, by providing its complete definition. Several lines later, Avicenna explains
that the cases when one amplifies their knowledge by improving the definition, one
does so “not intending the meaning of the name … but in respect of the essence/
object itself” (Easterners, Logic, 35.4–5). On the contrary, we have seen that Razī
does not allow this possibility. All definitions are nominal. All our attempts to con-
ceptualize anything through definitions or descriptions are bound to be explications
of intended meanings with which we refer to things and fail to grasp the essences of
things themselves. The difference between Avicenna and Razī is rooted in different
semantic approaches, which I suggested earlier in the analysis of Meno’s paradox.
Avicenna’s amplification of knowledge through conceptualization is directed towards
real essences as the extramental referents of names, regardless of which meanings we
use to refer to them. Razī’s understanding of conceptualization is, however, directed
towards the meanings themselves, with which we refer to extramental entities. This is
why Razī faces the paradox of analysis and ends up by concluding that all acts of
conceptualization are limited to explicating referentially opaque intensions.
Razī’s conclusion seems to go very far in the direction of scepticism. He states
that all our scientific definitions, all intentional acts of conceptualization of things
around us, do not reach the essences of things in themselves. Should we, how-
ever, conclude that Razī believes that we cannot know the world as such at all? I
do not think so. One should remember that Razī’s aim is a very specific one. He
wants to argue against the possibility of voluntarily acquired conceptualization of
things. This kind of knowing the world does not reach the essence of the worldly
things, according to Razī’s analysis. There are, however, different types of knowl-
edge that remain intact from Razī’s criticism of definitions. First and most impor-
tant is that which we saw him calling “immediate knowledge”. In his Substance of
Beliefs, Razī provides a whole series of sceptical arguments against the reliability of
direct perception, such as hallucinations, inability to distinguish between dreams and
reality, or the perception of continuums instead of distinct elements (87–90). His
sceptical doubts are not confined to sensible experience, but include all types of
immediate knowledge; he professes doubt even on axioms such as the principle of
non-contradiction (94–98). While this chapter of the Substance of Beliefs constitutes
an important source for the history of scepticism in Arabic philosophy that requires a
separate study, since we are now focusing on a different aspect of Razīan scepticism,
it suffices to say that at the end of the chapter, Razī very briefly waves away all these
doubts, saying that the reliability of immediate knowledge is self-evident (120).5
5 Razī may have arrived at some more sceptical position later in his life; alternatively he only wanted
to limit our knowledge in respect of divine things precisely because it must be fully grounded in the
given conceptions of sensibles (Shihadeh, 2006, pp. 181–203).
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The reliability of direct understanding of things in themselves thus remains beyond
any criticism. We might not be free in determining what we grasp this way: we see
what is presented to us. This forms the way to ethical conclusions, as I mentioned
earlier, since this makes us unfree in our beliefs about the world. But at least this is a
way to get to things in themselves. One should be very careful here. On the one
hand, immediate knowledge or direct grasp should not be confused with other kinds
of conceptualization, such as Aristotelian-Avicennian definitions. The former is the
given information that we perceive without being actively involved in the process in
anyway. The second is a spontaneous act of conceptualizing about this information.
Razī argues that direct grasp brings us to things in themselves, whereas such kinds
of conceptualization as Aristotelian-Avicennian scientific definitions only reach up
the meanings of words with which we refer to things. On the other hand, the result
of direct grasp is also that we possess a certain idea or concept about what things are
in their essential reality. We are just subjectively not involved in providing that idea:
we possess concepts without spontaneous conceptualization.6
Razī is thus very far from being a complete sceptic. As was already rightfully
concluded by Ibrahim (2013), Razī is sceptical only about our capacity to under-
stand the essences of things through their scientific definitions. But he is not
sceptical about the pre-scientific direct grasp of either sensible or non-sensible
items.7 Moreover, Razī also has a tool to bridge the gap between “immediate
knowledge” and the explicated meaning of words. I started explaining his theory
by drawing the distinction between conceptualization and assent. All the criticism
that we have seen against Aristotelian-Avicennian scientific definitions and
descriptions was on the side of conceptualization. However, both in the Razī,
Summary, Logic (111.8–11) and in the Summit of Reason (115.11–12), Razī
allows that one can and should argue about whether certain meanings, explicated
in a certain way, apply to concrete extramental things. This would be our way of
accounting for things “in respect of reality” (bi-ḥasab al-ḥaqīqa). Razī explains
in both passages that such an account would be a case of claiming (z-ʿ-m/d-w-y) –
that is, assenting – and not of conceptualizing. Unfortunately, Razī does not
explain how this part of his theory fits into the whole picture. Very speculatively,
one could suggest the following: I can explicate the meaning of “human1” as
“two-footed animal”. I also have a direct grasp of humans as such. Then I can
6 A further question concerns the epistemic way of possessing these concepts. Razī believes that direct
knowledge is a mere relation to the object known (see the forthcoming PhD thesis of Davlat Dadikhudah,
at the LMU Munich; I made some preliminary remarks on this issue in Benevich, 2019).
7 However, I cannot agree with Ibrahim’s (2013, p. 399) principle of the Indefinability of Sensibles, as becomes
clear from the following reconstruction. Razī’s point just is the primacy of sensible knowledge. Possessing sensi-
ble knowledge in the first place, we can further attempt to provide complete accounts of sensible particulars in
terms of assents, that is, make claims about their nature; see, for example, Summit of Reason (1.117.8–9).
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assent to the proposition in which the subject is the object of my direct grasp and
the predicate is “human1”. In the Razī, Summary, Logic (111.9–10), Razī
describes this procedure as follows: “One indicates a concrete existent and claims
that its reality is composed out of this and that”. This proposition will be false, as
“human1” does not capture the essence of humans in themselves. Then I can pro-
pose another meaning, “human2”, that is explicated as “rational animal”, and
repeat the procedure. This proposition will be right.8 Although one cannot grasp
the essences of things through the process of deliberate conceptualization, one
can do so by way of immediate grasp and consequently assent to different propo-
sitions in an attempt to account for the content of the immediate grasp. We know
the external object of inquiry through direct perception. Therefore, we do not just
know it insofar as it is captured by a certain meaning but rather as such. Hence
we can line up different propositions about that object and check which of them
is correct. We do not thus amplify our knowledge – unlike Avicenna’s view – but
we account for the contents of the given that we fully grasp anyway. Understand-
ing consists for Razī of three epistemic moments: ascribing a meaning to a word
and explicating it through definition (spontaneous conceptualization); perceiving
an object directly (given conceptualization); and identifying the former with the
second (assent). Conversely, Avicenna identifies the referent of the word with the
object of direct perception from the very beginning; for him, both conceptualiza-
tion and assent target that object. If this speculative reconstruction is correct, it
shows that Razī does not regard the task of Aristotelian-Avicennian scientific def-
initions as being completely in vain. By explicating meanings with which we
refer to external objects, we can try to provide a better account for whatever we
immediately grasp in terms of the nature of these objects. This makes scientific
definitions still useful, despite Razī’s scepticism towards the conceptualization of
real essences through them. We will see now that a similar conclusion applies to
Razī’s younger contemporary, Suhrawardī.
2. Suhrawardī: Sortal Constituents and Nominal Definitions
Suhrawardī’s attitude towards Aristotelian-Avicennian definitions finds its most
detailed expression in his Paths and Havens and Philosophy of Illumination. He
arrives at the same conclusion as Razī: the proper task of defining is to provide
nominal definitions (Paths and Havens, Logic, 90.3–4).9 Suhrawardī’s agenda,
8 The complete dependence of the verification of such a proposition on whatever is given in the direct
grasp makes the whole corpus of our beliefs not dependent on us. This is precisely Razī’s aim in terms
of his ethical determinist project (cf. Inquiries, 9.102–104).
9 This has already been noted by Ziai (1990, p. 110). However, I do not see any persuasive reasons for
Ziai’s connection of this Suhrawardīan thesis with the Platonic theory of anamnesis.
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however, is very different from that of Razī. He does not address the problem of
spontaneity of conceptualization anywhere. Instead Suhrawardī is more concerned
about the metaphysical unity of extramental things as well as about the proper
objects of intentional verbal reference.
When we talk of Suhrawardī’s theory of universals, the first notion that comes
to mind is iʿtibarat ʿaqliyya (conceptual considerations). Whether all universal
notions are such conceptual considerations for Suhrawardī and what it means for
his metaphysics when something is a conceptual consideration still remains a
desideratum for scholarship (cf. Benevich, 2017; Kaukua, 2020). There is, how-
ever, no doubt that (1) Suhrawardī believes that all genera and differentiae – that
is, all sortal constituents of essential definitions – are “conceptual considerations”
and (2) that it means for Suhrawardī in this case that we cannot regard the
extramental essences of things as mereological compounds, whose parts those
sortal constituents are. Suhrawardī argues at length in Paths and Havens
(365–368) that one should not regard genera and differentiae as real parts (agzaʾ)
of extramental essences. His conclusion, based on his favourite example of the
relation between being a colour and blackness is that “In reality, being a colour is
a merely conceptual consideration (was:f iʿtibarī), and [hence all] genera and dif-
ferentiae are likewise” (Paths and Havens, 368.11–12). Otherwise one would
need to count being a colour and the corresponding differentia (contacting the
sight) as two distinct things (šayʾan), two existents (mawg udan), and two features
(hayʾatan) that inhere in one and the same blackness. According to Suhrawardī,
sortal constituents do not have a concrete form (s: ura ʿayniyya) in the extramental
reality (Paths and Havens, 368.3–7).
These metaphysical observations about the nature of the constituents of defini-
tions stand in close connection with Suhrawardī’s criticism of definitions. Natu-
rally, if genera and differentiae are not extramental parts of extramental essences,
one cannot claim that definitions, which consist of them, directly correspond and
capture the constitution of extramental essences. The Avicennian theory of defini-
tions and essences presupposes that genera and differentiae are parts of essences
in a certain sense (Benevich, 2018, pp. 144–149). If Suhrawardī denies this, he
must also deny the theory of real essential definitions. So, he concludes his
proof that genera and differentiae are not real parts of essences by alluding to
his criticism of definitions: it is not that we grasp the reality of blackness
through its genus, being a colour, and some unknown differentia. Rather both
are accidental features – that is, extrinsic properties – of blackness as such
(even though they are grounded in the essence of blackness). Therefore one
cannot learn what blackness is on the basis of these two properties. Instead –
Suhrawardī suggests – we learn blackness “as it is” (kam a huwa). “Sensibles
qua sensibles are conceptualized naturally (fiṭrī)”. Hence one learns what
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blackness is through direct observation: “the object of direct observation (al-
muš ahad at) are principles to which natural [reasoning] should go back; one
does not [need to] understand (taʿrīf ) them” (Paths and Havens,
368.18–369.7).
This conclusion from the metaphysical section of Paths and Havens bears on
two elements of the criticism of real definitions, to which Suhrawardī constantly
alludes in his logical discussions of the topic. The first element is Suhrawardī’s
insistence that all the usual candidates for being genera and differentiae in fact
appear to be extrinsic and posterior to the natures of observable things. The rela-
tion between blackness, its genus, being a colour, and its differentia, contracting
the sight is one usual example (Paths and Havens, Logic, 88.8–11; Philosophy of
Illumination, 51.17). Another example is the definition of human as rational ani-
mal. Suhrawardī argues that being rational indicates a certain disposition. Dispo-
sitions, however, are secondary properties “that follow upon realities” (tawabiʿ li-
l-ḥaqaʾiq). Therefore rationality cannot be a part of the human essence. Instead
Suhrawardī argues that it is the simple human soul that is identical to human
essence itself. The soul, however, “can be only known through concomitants and
accidents” (Paths and Havens, Logic, 98–100; Philosophy of Illumina-
tion, 10.1–5).
This brings us to the second fundamental element of Suhrawardī’s criticism
of the Aristotelian-Avicennian theory of grasping essences through their essen-
tial definitions. These are his two arguments against this kind of grasp and his
proposed alternative account. Among the two, the second argument is better
known and easier to understand. Suhrawardī argues that one cannot ever gain
certainty that one has taken into account all essential features of the defined: “If
it remains possible that some other essential feature has not yet been perceived,
one cannot be certain of understanding a reality”. In other words, there can be
no guarantee for the completeness of definition (Philosophy of Illumination,
10.17–11.4). This is rather straightforward. However, the first argument that
Suhrawardī presents in the Philosophy of Illumination is more convoluted. It
has the following structure:
1. The unknown may only be grasped through the known.
2. The known through which one grasps the unknown must involve both the
general (genus) and specific (differentia) altogether.
3. Yet the specific differentia is known through:
3a. belonging to something else; but then it is not specific anymore.
3b. belonging to the defined; but then if neither is directly perceived by the
senses, the differentia is equally unknown as the defined.
3c. through something else; but then the issue about that which makes the dif-
ferentia known is raised again: is it common (3a) or specific (3b)?
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4. Therefore “The only recourse is features that are sensible, or evident in
another way, and that taken together are proper to the thing (yaḫis:s:u al-šayʾ
gumlatuha bi-l-igtimaʿ)” (Philosophy of Illumination, 10.10–16).
Within this argument Suhrawardī brings his reader step by step to the conclu-
sion that the only way to grasp something is to observe it directly with our senses
(in the case of sensibles). His argument focuses on proving that we cannot learn
essences through their specific differentiae. How will we know these specific dif-
ferentiae themselves? If we learn them by finding them in other subjects, then they
are not specific anymore. Nor can we learn of them as being specific, unless we
accept that we have already observed both the defined itself and its specific differ-
entia with our senses (which is the targeted conclusion). Nor can we suppose that
differentiae are grasped through giving a further definition, since then we ought to
ask about the way in which we grasp these differentiae of differentiae and so on ad
infinitum. Therefore, the only option remaining, Suhrawardī argues, is that we must
have already observed that the specific attributes, which the Peripatetics call differ-
entiae, belong to their subjects. If, however, this is the case, then we do not need
the process of making the defined understood through the differentiae and genera
anymore: we have already seen the defined with our own eyes and thus know it suf-
ficiently. This is the explicit conclusion Suhrawardī reaches later in the book:
[T3] The truth is that blackness is just one simple thing. It can be understood intellectually, with
no part of it remaining unknown. It cannot be understood by someone who has not observed
what it is like (yušahiduhu kama huwa), but anyone who has observed it does not need to come
to understand it (taʿrīf ). It has a form in the mind, just as it has a form in sensation. There is
no coming to understanding such things. (Philosophy of Illumination, 52.5–7, tr. Walbridge &
Ziai mod.)
Suhrawardī denies in this passage that there is any need for Avicenna’s doctrine
of taʿrīf to account for the act of knowing and understanding. One does not need
to make “blackness” understood through conceptualization if one has already
observed it with the senses. If one has not observed it, however, there is no way
for them to make it understood anyway. This conclusion as well as the second
argument from specification cannot but remind us of Razī’s theory of the opposi-
tion between direct knowledge and spontaneous conceptualization. Razī argued
in his paradox of circularity that either one does not know that P belongs to x
specifically, and thus one cannot come to understand x through P; or one knows
it, but then one has already understood x in the first place. Suhrawardī’s line of
argument follows the same pattern. Moreover, we have also seen that Razī’s main
conclusion was that direct perception is the only way to reach the essences of
things in themselves.10 Suhrawardī concludes the same in T3: in order to know
things, we need to observe them as they are.11
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If, however, definitions are not necessary for knowing things, why have them
at all? Here, Suhrawardī’s position is again reminiscent of Razī’s:
[T4] Some use the term “definition” for the formula that signifies a thing’s quiddity. That formula
indicates essential [constituents] and the features that are intrinsic to the thing’s true reality,
whereas a formula that allows the true reality to be known by means of external accidents is called
a “description”. Yet, consider the example of the body. Some affirm that the body has parts, but
others are in doubt, while still others deny it. (You will learn later what these “parts” are.) For
most people, these parts do not belong to their understanding of the thing named. Instead, the
name signifies only the totality of the concomitants of its conceptualization. Or consider water and
air. When it is affirmed that these have parts that cannot be sensed, some people will deny it. So
those parts are not included in their understanding of water and air. Even if the body is a part of
every corporeal nature, and is as we have said, people will only conceptualize those parts apparent
to them. It is those aspects that are meant by the name, both for the one who coined the name and
for them [sc. the people who deny invisible parts]. (Philosophy of Illumination, 9.11–20,
tr. Walbridge & Ziai mod.)
At first glance, it may seem that Suhrawardī argues in this passage for the idea
that all definitions in fact are descriptions. First, he seems to introduce the Peripa-
tetic notions of definitions and descriptions, as we saw them in the previous sec-
tion of this article. Where definitions provide conceptualizations of the essences
of things through their essential constituents, descriptions provide their conceptu-
alization on the basis of extrinsic attributes. Having drawn this distinction,
Suhrawardī then seems to argue that when one defines body some may think that
one alludes to its constituent parts. However, according to Suhrawardī, the usual
candidates for being the parts of the essence of body are in fact its extrinsic attri-
butes. The same applies to the definitions of water and air. Right after this pas-
sage, Suhrawardī also alludes to the example of human that we saw above:
“rationality” does not capture the essence of the human soul but rather its extrin-
sic concomitant (Philosophy of Illumination, 10.1–5). One may naturally suppose
that as all these attributes are merely extrinsic, then definitions must simply be
replaced with descriptions. One would conceptually grasp the essences of things
through their extrinsic attributes alone.
There is some basis for this interpretation. We have seen that Suhrawardī’s
metaphysical background for his criticism of definitions is the statement that enti-
ties such as blackness or humans are in fact simple and are not mereological
10 Razī’s position is specifically reminiscent of Suhrawardī’s in Summit of Reason (1.119) and The
Commentary on the Elements of Philosophy (1.67–68); see also Ibrahim (2013, pp. 399–400). According
to both authors, our direct naive grasp of, for example, heat is the primary and ultimate source of knowl-
edge about heat.
11 This, in fact, is a part of Suhrawardī’s major epistemological theory of knowledge as immediate pres-
ence. However, I cannot explore this in detail in the present article (for more on this theory, see
Kaukua, 2013). Its source might be Abu l-Barakat’s (d. 1164/65) epistemology; on this, see
Benevich (2020).
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compounds. Therefore, one cannot provide their definitions, since those would
need to contain the sortal constituents of the defined. Why not just say that the
essences of all these simple objects are fully understood through descriptions?
Suhrawardī moves us in this direction in Paths and Havens: “That’s why the Mas-
ter Abu ʿAlī [sc. Avicenna] claimed in the treatises which he ascribed to the East-
erners (which are only partially and incompletely available) that simples can be
described but not defined” (88.12–13; cf. Easterners, Logic, 36.18–20). This
statement could be interpreted as Suhrawardī’s charitable reading of Avicenna.
Although Avicenna did not reach the understanding that most of his usual candi-
dates for defining are in fact simple, Avicenna has the theoretical framework to
conclude that if something is simple, then one arrives at a full understanding of it
through descriptions – Suhrawardī’s own position, on this interpretation. How-
ever, right in the next sentence Suhrawardī reveals his critical stance to Avicenna
even on this reading: “Even though he ascribed it to the Easterners, it still is the
same as the doctrines of the Peripatetics” (89.1). This statement may be inter-
preted very differently, but I suggest that Suhrawardī thereby means that the the-
ory of scientific descriptions is not much closer to the truth than the Aristotelian-
Avicennian theory of essential definitions.
Suhrawardī several times quite explicitly rejects that one can fully understand
things through descriptions. First, in Philosophy of Illumination (52.2–3) he
applies the aforementioned specification problem to grasping blackness through
its concomitants: “Furthermore, if conception is assumed to take place by means
of concomitants, the concomitants will also have specific properties, and the same
difficulty will apply to them too”. In other words, I cannot know whether contra-
cting the sight which is now regarded as an extrinsic concomitant rather than a
specific differentia, specifically belongs to blackness. As we have seen, the only
way to escape it is direct observation of blackness. But then one does not need to
conceptualize blackness as “the entity which contracts sight” anymore, as one
already knows it as such. Likewise, in Paths and Havens Suhrawardī says:
[T5] If everything through which one understands the objects of sense-perception and observation
are [in fact] more obscure than them, one does not [need] to provide a definition or description for
them. Whiteness is more evident in itself than its being widening the sight. (Paths and Havens,
Logic, 97.11–12)
Given that Suhrawardī explicitly states that definitions and descriptions are
equally unnecessary, since direct observation provides more evident information,
or even impossible because of the completeness and specification problems, one
might need a different interpretation of T4.12 For this we need to turn again to
semantics. One may notice that Suhrawardī alludes in T4 to the signification of
names. For him, it is not only important that the alleged parts of the definition of
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body are merely its extrinsic attributes. Rather, these parts also form an extrinsic
description of an underlying subject with which (description) we refer to that sub-
ject. Here, we have returned to the distinction between (1) taking objects under a
certain description, i.e., insofar as they are captured by certain meanings, and
(2) the referents of words as such. When one defines black as “the colour which
contracts sight”, according to Suhrawardī, one does not define the essence of
blackness itself. Instead, one defines the intended meaning, in other words, black-
ness taken under a certain description. As Suhrawardī says in T4, “people only
conceptualize those parts apparent to them”. This means that our attempts to
define things are bound to be limited by how we intend them and by the mean-
ings of words through which we approach them. The intended meanings are
proper objects of definitions and not the essences of things in themselves. This
line of thought is repeated in Paths and Havens:
[T6] When people refer to a certain animal as a “horse”, they neither intend nor coin something
that is obscure to them. Rather they capture that which they observe in terms of the form of a
horse and its properties. This is what they mean (mafhum) and nothing else. Whatever is beyond it
is not included in the referent of the name. (Paths and Haven, Logic, 96.10–13)
Here Suhrawardī explains his position on semantics. The referents of words are
not things in themselves. Rather they are things insofar as they are referred to
with meanings whose content depends on the point of view of the observer. For
analytical readers, one may better get to the sense of this theory if one compares
it to H. Putnam’s (1973) famous statement that “meanings ain’t in the heads”. For
Putnam, it does not matter how one refers to the object called “Venus”: as
“Morning Star” or “Evening Star”. The referent of the name will be the object
itself, and the meaning of “Morning Star” and “Evening Star” will be Venus itself
(as meaning must fix the reference, according to Putnam). This is precisely what
Suhrawardī would deny. The referents of names are something only insofar as it
is described respectively as “Morning Star” and “Evening Star”. This is why
when we define things we can be satisfied with either meaning. We can give defi-
nitions of something qua being “Morning Star” or “Evening Star” but we cannot
give an essential definition of the real extramental subject that underlies both of
them. The “meaning” here is equivalent to the extent to which we understand the
underlying subject. As Suhrawardī states in T6, we cannot refer to something that
12 One might note that descriptions may still be in better standing than definitions. Although they are
not the means to make something fully understood, one still might use them in order to account for
things in themselves in accordance with that which one has primarily observed directly (like we had it in
Razī’s account of assent). At least the problem of simplicity does not befall them. This might be the rea-
son why Suhrawardī does not criticize descriptions as harshly as definitions in Paths and Havens, Logic
(101.3–5).
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we do not know. With this he radically differs from Putnam. In Putnam’s theory,
we could be completely wrong about what Venus actually is, but we still refer to
the object itself with the name “Venus”. Conversely, to repeat the analytical par-
lance of my analysis of Razī’s theory of nominal definitions, the proper objects of
reference and therefore scientific definitions are objects as opaquely referred to
with intensions for Suhrawardī, and not referentially transparent essences of
things in themselves.
Limiting definitions to objects under certain descriptions fits quite nicely into
Suhrawardī’s metaphysics of genera and differentiae. As I mentioned at the begin-
ning of this section, Suhrawardī argues that genera and differentiae, such as being
a colour and contracting the sight, are not real parts of extramental compounds.
Rather they are predicates that are said of further more basic and primary con-
cepts (the latter being like blackness or humanity, that is, species). This stands in
agreement with his semantics of definition. If definitions (genera and differentiae)
are only given of objects qua meanings, and meanings already are our ways of
conceptualizing things, then genera and differentiae can only be predicated of fur-
ther concepts and cannot be posited as their real parts.
If this interpretation is correct, this is how one ought to understand
Suhrawardī’s thesis that “the statement which unfolds the meaning of something
is precisely what the most noble among the people of inquiry inclined to [with
the notion of definition]” (Paths and Haven, Logic, 90.3–4), which I referred to
at the beginning of this section. As it was correctly diagnosed by Ziai, Suhrawardī
thereby states that Aristotelian-Avicennian epistemology can at best give us only
nominal definitions. Thus, Suhrawardī reproduces the Avicennian doctrine in T2
(90.4–91.8) that it is impossible to amplify nominal definitions. This is quite in
line with Suhrawardī’s position in T4 and T6 that definitions are only descriptions
of objects. Given that any new definition will have additional meanings, it cannot
be intensionally identical to the previous one. Rather, the new definition will be a
nominal definition of a different description/appearance of the thing.
Next to the impossibility of amplification, there is another important point of
contact between Avicenna’s theory of nominal definitions and Suhrawardī’s. In
T4, Suhrawardī does not divorce definitions and meanings from real things. In
fact, he establishes a connection between them. He says that the objects of defini-
tion (definienda) are bundles of quasi-extrinsic attributes, i.e., concomitants and
accidents of the underlying subjects. We have seen how this idea might mislead
someone to conclude that Suhrawardī believes that we can fully conceptualize the
essences of things in themselves through their extrinsic descriptions. On the basis
of semantics, we might conclude now that Suhrawardī believes in the conceptuali-
zation of things insofar as certain extrinsic descriptions apply to them. When one
conceptualizes (s:-w-r) or understands (ʿ-r-f ), one still targets things although only
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under certain descriptions. This idea, which was not so explicit in Razī, might
however still go back to their original common source: the Avicennian theory of
nominal definitions. In the Easterners, Avicenna explains that one can easily have
the nominal definition of humans as two-footed animals (I take my own example)
“because there is an animal with that attribute, and there is a certain way of con-
sidering (iʿtibar) it in accordance with that attribute, and nothing prohibits its con-
sideration in accordance with that attribute to have a name for it” (34.17–19).
This is a very important clarification. It does not follow that one cannot argue
about nominal definitions simply because they are completely random. It is not
that I would randomly take the notion of two-footed animal and call it “human”
because I want to do so. Rather, nominal definitions are given of meanings that
are still ways of thinking about real things. Humans do have the attribute of being
two-footed. It might not capture their essence, but it still belongs to them. There-
fore when I give a nominal definition of humans as two-footed animals I refer to
them with a meaning which stands for the way that I consider humans.
Suhrawardī’s idea that the proper objects of nominal definitions are in a way
extrinsic attributes of things might be a development of this idea. “Colour that
contracts sights” is the nominal definition of blackness. But it is not a definition
of a completely random idea of how to conceive of blackness. Rather it is the def-
inition of the way that blackness appears to me – as Suhrawardī was insistent in
T4 and T6. This kind of epistemically limited appearance is still different from
the transparent appearance that Suhrawardī was talking about in terms of direct
observation. After all, it gets us only to some attributes, not to all of them (the
notions of .z-h-r and š-h-d, however, are equally used for both). The difference
between two kinds of appearance consists in the presence of the intentional act of
conceptualization. As Suhrawardī says in T4 and T6, we nominally define some-
thing when we intend that thing with a name. We define certain intended aspects
of things. On the contrary, direct observation is not intended; it grasps all the
attributes of the object (Philosophy of Illumination, 11.5–6).
If this reconstruction of some of Suhrawardī’s rather obscure remarks is correct,
we can finally draw some conclusions about Suhrawardī’s scepticism. Similarly to
Razī, Suhrawardī is very sceptical about the utility of the Aristotelian-Avicennian
theory of scientific definitions. For Suhrawardī, the objects of such definitions are
the intended meanings of words; they are not the essence of things in themselves.
The project of conceptualization (in the Aristotelian-Avicennian sense) is thus
bound to fail because of the issues of completeness and specification. Instead, we
can only conceptualize things under certain descriptions. However, again similar
to Razī, Suhrawardī has his own non-sceptical way of getting in contact with
things in themselves. This is their direct, non-conceptualizing, pre-scientific
(in the Aristotelian sense of “science”) observation through sense-perception
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(or other ways if the object is not sensible, like, e.g., our self-awareness).
Suhrawardī is thus in no way a global sceptic.13 He is only a sceptic about
Aristotelian-Avicennian science; in this respect, he shares Razī’s criticisms of that
science. Suhrawardī also, like Razī, tries to connect the objects of nominal defini-
tions to things in themselves by referring to the objects of nominal definitions as
the extrinsic attributes of the latter. This might be the reason why Suhrawardī,
despite his overall scepticism, still says in Paths and Havens that the usefulness
of such nominal definitions is obvious (Paths and Haven, Logic, 91.15). Nominal
definitions are not completely random; they target things under certain descrip-
tions or target certain ways of considering things. Although Suhrawardī has dif-
ferent reasons for the usefulness thesis than those which I suggested for Razī,
both thinkers still grant that despite its problems the Aristotelian-Avicennian the-
ory of definitions should not therefore be completely abandoned.
3. Abu l-Barakat: Meaning and Essence
Both Razī’s and Suhrawardī’s criticism of definition make use of the Peripatetic
concession that giving real definitions is extremely difficult, even if one grants
that it is possible at all. Suhrawardī says that “Their Master (s: aḥib) admits its dif-
ficulty” (Philosophy of Illumination, 11.5–6). In Paths and Havens, however,
Suhrawardī remarks that if one limits definitions to being of meanings alone, then
one avoids these difficulties (Paths and Havens, Logic 98.1–4). Likewise, in Razī,
we find the following passage:
[T7] [The difficulty of composing a definition] is owing to the difficulty of grasping the proximate
genus and the proximate differentia, as has been established. Once the Sheikh [sc. Avicenna]
established this, the author of the Reconsidered [sc. Abu l-Barakat] disagreed, saying: in fact this
is very easy, since definitions are definitions of names, and names are names of items grasped by
the intellect. When any item is grasped in the intellect, surely one will have a perfect grasp of the
part that makes it what it is and is shared with other things, and also of the part that makes it what
it is and is distinctive of it. From this point of view, definition is easy. Fair judgment: if the goal
of [the definition] is to provide a detailed analysis of the referent of a name, then it is as the author
of the Reconsidered says. But if its goal is to grasp existent quiddities, then this is very difficult.
(Razī, Summary, Logic, 118.2–10)
Razī starts by stating a rather straightforward idea that composing definitions is
not an easy task because it is difficult to discover the proximate genus and differ-
entia – that is, to approach the essence of the thing itself. He ascribes this idea to
Avicenna, in contrast to Suhrawardī who probably ascribes it to Aristotle
(because of the s: aḥib-title). I suggest, however, that neither of them has any
13 Suhrawardī explicitly rejects global scepticism in Paths and Havens (212).
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concrete Aristotelian or Avicennian passage in mind when they write this. My
hypothesis is based on what Razī says in the rest of T7. He mentions, for
instance, that Abu l-Barakat al-Baġdadī, a scholar who predates him by a genera-
tion, disagreed with Avicenna on the basis of his theory that definitions are only
definitions of the meanings of names and not of real things. Razī in his “fair
judgement” agrees with Abu l-Barakat that there is no real difficulty in defining
meanings; however, real definitions are not easy to grasp. As we can infer from
the analysis in section 1 of this article, Razī in fact thinks that Abu l-Barakat’s
position is the correct one.
So, both in Razī and Suhrawardī we have an account of the difficulty of real
definitions and the easiness of nominal definitions, the latter being explicitly
ascribed to Abu l-Barakat by Razī. This gives us the initial basis for my main his-
torical hypothesis in this article, that both Razī and Suhrawardī in fact draw on
Abu l-Barakat in their analysis of definitions and the conclusion that all Aristote-
lian-Avicennian definitions are in fact of meanings (or: of things under certain
descriptions) and not of real essences.
Abu l-Barakat devotes about fifty pages to issues of semantics and definitions
in the section “On Understanding and Conceptualization of Meanings by Way of
Definitions and Descriptions” in his book, the Reconsidered. This is due to his
style of writing, according to which he leads the reader step by step to the conclu-
sion. His conclusion is found in the last chapter which is directly devoted to our
issue: the difficulty and easiness of providing definitions. Abu l-Barakat starts the
chapter by reporting arguments for the difficulty of defining.14 Among them are
taking a remote genus instead of proximate (such as defining man as “rational
body”); not being able to discern mere extensional identity and real essential
implication (such as thinking that one does not need to mention both “sensation”
and “voluntary motion” in the definition of animal, because they are extensionally
identical anyway); and the completeness of definition: how can I be sure that I
have gathered all specific differentiae that belong to a specific essence? All the
above shows why definitions are very difficult or even impossible to achieve
(Reconsidered, 112.15–113.10). As was correctly traced by Razī, Abu l-Barakat
disagrees:
[T8] The difficulty of [whoever provides the definition] about real existence in terms of what is
primary and what is secondary does not apply to everything defined or to everyone defining; nor
14 Cf. Avicenna, Definitions, 2–3 (identified by Khaled El-Rouayheb in his edition of Ḫunagī’s
Unveiling, 60). Furthermore, there are several problematic passages in Avicenna’s Marginal Notes (§62,
345, 718–719; I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for these references). Their interpretation
requires further study, but it should be preliminarily noted that Avicenna does not question our capacity
to know the essences of things there. Rather he just insists that we first directly grasp (ʿ-r-f/d-r-k) their
extrinsic properties and then make inferences about the natures of things on the basis of those properties.
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does it apply at all times; nor does it apply more than it applies to syllogisms and [demonstrative]
sciences … Likewise if defining is difficult in some cases and at some times, nevertheless this is
not a difficulty in reality, since verbal definition [only] relates whatever results from the thing in
the mind. It is that for which one posits a name and for which mental and semantic (maʿnawī)
unity is established. (Reconsidered, 1.116.8–14)
Abu l-Barakat starts with statistical reasoning. The difficulties about definitions
(here he talks about distinguishing essential from extrinsic) do not apply predomi-
nantly. He also uses an ad hominem argument: why say that definitions are diffi-
cult and not say that syllogisms and demonstration are as well? Apparently he
thinks that Peripatetics would not be willing to subscribe to the latter thesis. How-
ever, if one is not convinced by these rather wacky arguments, Abu l-Barakat then
proposes his real solution. Definitions are in fact not even intended to capture the
real essences of things in themselves. Instead, definitions are “verbal”. They tar-
get the mental content which a certain name signifies. This is how Abu l-Barakat
finishes his argument. This is also how he starts it: “Definitions are definitions in
respect of names. Names are names of whatever has definitions in respect of defi-
nitions” (Reconsidered, 1.113.13).
The main contention of Abu l-Barakat is that all definitions are nominal:
“Know that definitions only are in respect of names and names only are in respect
of definitions; or better say, names only are in respect of meanings and meanings
are the meanings of [names]” (Reconsidered, 1.110.1–2). So, with Abu l-Barakat,
we encounter once more the theory that definitions are of meanings and words
that signify them, and not of the essences of things in themselves. Again, one
should not understand this theory as stating that one defines some randomly pos-
ited meanings of names. Consider, for instance, the following passage:
[T9] One and the same thing has multiple names in respect of multiple definitions and multiple
definitions in respect of multiple names. All these are in respect of multiple attributes and descrip-
tions. For instance, “human” [may be named] insofar as he is a body, a human, a writer, a doctor,
a knower. He has a definition in respect of each of [these] names. Nevertheless, even though a def-
inition would be in respect of names, it only is a definition insofar as it belongs to the existent
object of naming, so that the result is an existing reality. It is in relation to it that it is a definition.
(Reconsidered, 1.111.12–17)
Abu l-Barakat repeats in this passage his main claim that all definitions are
nominal. Names signify meanings that belong to some concrete really existent
object. Meanings are identified as attributes and descriptions of concrete objects
in this passage. For instance, a human can be described as an animal, a human,
or a writer. All these are meanings of names with which we refer to certain attri-
butes of a concrete thing. The meanings that are intended in definitions hence are
not completely detached from reality. Rather, we still intend to conceive of real
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things. It is only that we always end up with conceiving things under certain
descriptions – a position that we have also seen in Suhrawardī.
How does this theory help overcome the proposed difficulties for definitions?
This is Abu l-Barakat’s response:
[T10] We say: if [differentiae] are unknown, then they are unknown either as distinguishing differ-
entiae [in the mind] or as the [extramental] attributes that belong (mawg uda) to the subject of attri-
bution. If [they are unknown] as the attributes that belong to the subject of attribution, then one
cannot know them. You have learned that whoever performs understanding (ʿarif ) designates
(yusamma) whatever he has understood insofar as he understood it and he defines that which he
has designated insofar as he designated it. Definition is a definition in terms of name (bi-ḥasab al-
ism); and the name and the definition are in terms of understanding (al-maʿrifa). If someone desig-
nates whatever he understood he explains (yufassiru) the name with a definition, which is a
detailed analysis of understanding (tafs:īl al-maʿrifa). Whatever is unknown does not enter the defi-
nition in respect of which someone gave a name and a definition. If something is unknown it does
not disturb the knowledge of the known insofar as it is knowledge. For instance, when we under-
stand from something – such as snow – that it is a white body, yet we do not know whether it is
cotton or snow, our ignorance about its being snow or cotton does not damage our understanding
of its being a body and of its whiteness. So, if we designate it by a name that refers to whatever
we understood and then we define it in respect of this name, so we have just performed the expli-
cation of a name and a demonstration of the cognition insofar as we understood it. Whatever we
did not know remains unknown to us until we learn it differently. (Reconsidered, 1.114.5–13)
This is a central passage in understanding Abu l-Barakat’s theory of definitions.
He is trying to solve the problem of how we can be sure that we made clear all
differentiae that were needed to capture the essence of the subject. His response
consists in distinguishing two ways of looking at these differentiae and accord-
ingly two possible tasks of definitions. One way would be regarding differentiae
as really existent attributes of real entities. The task of such definitions would be
establishing the essences of these entities. Abu l-Barakat concedes that in this
case the difficulty holds. The short sentence that I italicized goes as far as stating
that one cannot know things in this way at all. This is probably the most sceptical
statement that one can find in the discussion of real definitions in the three
authors I discuss in this article. However, Abu l-Barakat immediately moves away
from this side of the picture. What interests him more is showing that the reliabil-
ity of definitions is not in any way harmed by the fact that our knowledge of
things in themselves is limited. The reason is that we do not attempt to attain the
essences of those things at all. Here, the theory of nominal definitions is helpful.
The constant refrain of Abu l-Barakat’s theory is repeated: definitions are of
meanings designated by names, and meanings relate to things insofar as we
understand them. His example is grasping a certain white object, cotton or snow.
If I only know that it is something white – for instance, by looking at it from a
distance – then I will also define it as “white body” and not as “white cold body”,
for instance, if it is snow. Someone may argue that by this I express my lack of
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knowledge; Abu l-Barakat, however, would state that the definition does not tar-
get the essence of the object itself and hence neither does it miss the unknown
aspects of its essence. Definition only targets the way I consider the object as it
appears to me. Therefore every definition is complete and correct. The analytic
reader may again remember the contrast to Putnam’s theory of meanings: mean-
ings are the objects themselves. Abu l-Barakat’s theory is the diametric opposite.
For him meanings are our ways of considering things; definitions are given to
meanings that are either mental or – more broadly speaking – dependent on how
we intend things.
Semantics thus prepares the way for Abu l-Barakat’s theory of definition. If
one goes back to the very beginning of the section on understanding and defini-
tions, one can see the roots of Abu l-Barakat’s approach to definitions:
[T11] As a human being in the origins of his inquiry is not aware of the distinction between the
conceptions of his mind and real existents in whatever he perceives, he therefore will equally sig-
nify them with names and refer to them with words in the same way. As a result, he will name an
image of Zayd “Zayd” and the conceptual form (al-s: ura) of human “human”. In reality, the naming
of all significations belongs to the conceptions of his mind primarily and [only] through them does
he [refer] to existents. Consequently, if he sees a horse from a distance and the reality of its form
has not been properly established and represented (yatamaṯṯalu) in his mind, he will instead be
confused about it and will think that it is a donkey; yet he still designates it in respect to that
which he has conceptualized in his mind, though not with a name that would be posited for its true
reality as such. (Reconsidered, 1.60.9–17)
Abu l-Barakat’s central conclusion in this passage is that names primarily sig-
nify intensions, or opaque concepts, and only through them, secondarily, the exis-
tent things in themselves. In order to prove his point, Abu l-Barakat places us in
a referentially opaque context: in terms of the transparence of our knowledge, we
cannot immediately distinguish between cases where we conceive of a real thing
as opposed to just an image of it. This limitation of our knowledge, however,
should not have any impact on the application of nominal reference: whether it is
a real human or only an image of it, I equally signify them as “human”. Abu l-
Barakat concludes that names must signify the common element present in both
cases, which is, namely, the way in which things appear to me. The next example
serves his point. I might not really know what I am seeing. In reality it is a horse,
but I see it as a donkey (it may appear smaller to me because of the distance). So,
I refer to it as “donkey”. To what do I refer in this case? Putnam would say that I
still refer to the horse itself, regardless of my false way of seeing it. On the con-
trary, Abu l-Barakat claims that I refer to the horse under the description of “don-
key” – that is, in respect of my false way of seeing it.
Abu l-Barakat confirms his semantics when he speaks about the identification
of things. In the chapter dedicated to the traditional Peripatetic question “what is
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it?”, Abu l-Barakat opts for descriptive or qualitative identification. He starts by
stating that every individual which we intend with a reference (naqs:uduhu bi-l-
išara) is known to us in respect of a collection (magmuʿ) of attributes that we
ascribe to it. It may change its place and move through time, but we still perceive
it as the same individual due to the commonness of predicates (Reconsidered,
1.77.18–78.3). It may just suffice that it appears to have the same corporeal form.
Abu l-Barakat brings forth the example of when we identify a human corpse as
still being the same individual (1.78.3–16). Although this is rather an example of
a failure of identification, Abu l-Barakat argues that we are justified in doing so,
given that we identify individual objects insofar as we understand them:
[T12] We say “he” about [a human] insofar as we understand (ʿarafnahu) him, whereas he says
“I” about himself insofar as he understands [himself], and the extent to which we understand him
is different from that to which he understands himself, and that through which we understood him
remains [i.e., the corpse], so we say in this respect that it is him. That through which he under-
stood himself does not remain. Nevertheless we are right (nataḥaqqaqu) in saying that it is one
and the same “him” due to [the commonness] of two perceptions (idrakayn). For instance, some-
one may show us a dinar and we store its [conceptual] form after its accurate observation and com-
plete understanding. Then, if one runs it itself by us again, we say: this is the same as that. We say
“the same” about two resembling things in which we cannot recognize any difference. For
instance, if another dinar is minted on a coin in the same way and its magnitude and weight is the
same, and its every attribute and mode that we observe in it [is the same], then we say that it is the
same [dinar] although in reality it is not the same. (Reconsidered, 1.78.17–24)
Abu l-Barakat starts by explaining the specific case of why we refer to the
corpse of the human being as the same person. His reason is that the bundle of
qualities, the amount to which we recognized the person, remains the same
between when he was alive and now after he has died. We identify the object of
our perception as the same object because its bundle of qualities has not changed.
He means that we identify, e.g., Socrates on the basis of his body and physical
appearance, and even though he is already dead, the body remains the same. Our
identification, furthermore, proceeds regardless of Socrates’ own perception of
himself, i.e., the fact that he identifies himself as having qualities beyond the
body, i.e., his soul.
In the second section, Abu l-Barakat extrapolates his analysis to the general
problem of the identity of indiscernibles. If two entities appear the same, we may
conclude that they are the same. It is important to note that Abu l-Barakat enter-
tains here the epistemological variant of Leibniz’s law. It is irrelevant whether the
dinar that one shows to me at t1 actually is the same as that at t2. More impor-
tantly, I see all the qualities to be the same and hence conclude they are numeri-
cally identical. This conclusion is based on Abu l-Barakat’s semantics and
epistemology: it suffices that we identify things insofar as they have same
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descriptions; whether they actually are the same or not, regardless of how we
identify them, lies beyond our epistemic scope.
The “insofar as we understand it” in T12 is the clause that connects all three
discussions: meaning and reference, identification, and definitions. This is Abu l-
Barakat’s way of replacing the essence of things in themselves with their descrip-
tions under which they appear to us. This idea is rooted in his analysis of essenti-
ality. Abu l-Barakat devotes several chapters to the notion of essentiality in the
section on understanding and definitions. There he argues against the Avicennian
definition of essentiality (ḏatiyya) in terms of an elimination test: “P is essential
for x iff if P is eliminated (r-f-ʿ) x is eliminated as well” (Reconsidered, 1.70–71;
cf. Benevich, 2018, pp. 368–376). Abu l-Barakat understands the Avicennian
elimination test in terms of ontological dependence: if x is ontologically depen-
dent on P then P is essential for x. He objects from two perspectives. First, Abu
l-Barakat is concerned about the status of essentiality for the essences of individ-
uals. For instance, one might argue that “humanity” is essential for Zayd, given
that Zayd is ontologically dependent on the presence of humanity in him. How-
ever – Abu l-Barakat argues – if Zayd is dependent on his specific properties as
well (such as his height), then should we also conclude that they are essential for
him (71.14–17)? The second problem is raised later, together with a nice sum-
mary of Abu l-Barakat’s own position, right in the middle of his discussion of
definitions:
[T13] [Avicenna] said about [the essential] that it is that whose elimination eliminates that which
it describes (maws: uf ). I add: insofar as it is described with it. He adds: insofar as it is existent. He
applies essentiality to existence. We apply essentiality to designation and meaning. The reason is
that existence only depends on necessitating causes of the existent and nothing else.
(Reconsidered, 1.115.19–22)
Abu l-Barakat argues that essentiality cannot mean ontological dependence of
x on P because effects likewise depend on causes, yet one would not say that they
are essential for them. With this, he proposes a solution as well as clarifying how
his understanding of essentiality is different from that of Avicenna. Avicenna
wants to talk about the essential as belonging to real existent objects in them-
selves. That is why he was faced with the problem of essentiality for individuals.
Abu l-Barakat suggests completely removing essentiality from the level of exis-
tent quiddities and instead applying essentiality only to the level of our conceptu-
alization and understanding them. P is not essential for x anymore. It is essential
for x under a certain description. It is this understanding of essentiality that paves
the way for Abu l-Barakat’s theory of definitions as nominal or intensional. One
may remember that Abu l-Barakat suggested in T9 different descriptions under
which one may give a definition to a human. Among intuitively essential
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candidates such as human and animal, we saw writer and doctor. These are, how-
ever, accidents; how can one give the definition of human in terms of his acci-
dents? Abu l-Barakat’s understanding of essentiality helps avoid this question. It
is essential for a human to be a writer or a doctor not as such but rather only
under the description of being a writer or being a doctor. As Abu l-Barakat is sat-
isfied with this kind of essentiality, he also allows descriptional definitions.
So far it may seem that Abu l-Barakat, if not a complete sceptic, is at least a
relativist: his programme of scientific definitions is very modest. For him, we do
not even attempt to attain real definitions of extramental essences. Instead, we
focus completely on internal meanings and the way things appear to us. At the
end of his discussion of identification, Abu l-Barakat brings the reader to a very
natural conclusion of his theory of essentiality: something is essential for a sub-
ject “if it is intrinsic to the reality of something as its part – that is, to the
intended meaning” (Reconsidered, 1.79.19–20). Does this mean that Abu l-
Barakat suggests replacing “realities” of things with the intended meanings? This
would make Abu l-Barakat a relativist or even bring him into the direction of ide-
alism. However, there are three elements in his theory that direct our reading of
him in the opposite direction.
First, though Abu l-Barakat may divorce essentiality from real existents and
ontological dependence, he does not completely exclude that one may keep track
of the latter aspect of reality as well. One simply should not think of it in terms
of essentiality and definitions. Abu l-Barakat still believes that one can ask for
the core (as:l) element of real individual existents. The response ought to be given
in terms of substance (gawhar) and not in terms of essence (ḏat) (Reconsidered,
1.80.23). Substancehood should apparently be established in terms of ontological
priority and independence, but this question lies beyond the scope of this article,
What is important for us now is that Abu l-Barakat interprets all traditional
Aristotelian-Avicennian real essential definitions as nominal and intensional defi-
nitions, whereas his own “real definitions” are about ontological dependence and
substancehood.
The second essentialist element in Abu l-Barakat’s theory concerns the distinc-
tion between conceptualization (tas:awwur) and understanding (maʿrifa). We have
seen in the first section that Razī takes these notions as synonymous. Both signify
the intentional act of understanding the given information in terms of our own
concepts: I perceive an object and then interpret it as “human”. We saw also that
both Razī and Suhrawardī allow a different way of reaching the external world by
way of direct non-intentional observation. Abu l-Barakat precedes this distinction
and puts it into the terms of the difference between conceptualization and under-
standing. For Abu l-Barakat, tas:awwur just means learning the given information
by heart, whereas maʿrifa always means recognition. The first time I see Zayd, I
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form an idea of him. As I argued elsewhere, we have no subjective influence on
this procedure according to Abu l-Barakat (see Benevich, 2020). However, when
I see Zayd again, I might recognize him as such or I might not (Reconsidered,
82–83). Everything that we have seen so far about Abu l-Barakat’s theory of defi-
nitions in fact applies only to this second epistemological stage. Aristotelian-
Avicennian definitions and descriptions are recognitions of things in the external
world. These fall short of the essences of things. We end up recognizing and
defining Zayd only insofar as we recognized/understood him. However, the first
stage of tas:awwur remains intact. It means “forming representations in the mind
from the observations of concrete objects” (83.1–3). Here we deal with a result of
a direct observation – as was the case in Razī and Suhrawardī – which connects
us with essences of things in themselves.15
The last but not least essentialist aspect of Abu l-Barakat’s epistemology proba-
bly arises against his will. Here we must turn back to his theory of intensional
definitions. If definitions are of meanings, how are they construed? Quite in line
with his theory of meaning, Abu l-Barakat interprets definitions as the “analysis”
(taḥlīl) and “detailed account” (tafs:īl) of that which is understood primarily
(Reconsidered, 1.106.20; 107.11; cf. Razī’s definition of definition as the
“detailed analysis of the name’s referent”). One of Abu l-Barakat’s examples is
that I understand something as grey and then by way of analysis I recognize that
the object of my thought is in fact a combination of white and black (1.106.12).
So far so good, since we remain on the level of intensions or things considered
under certain descriptions. His other example, however, is how we arrive at a bet-
ter understanding of a human starting from the general grasp of it as a body. Abu
l-Barakat says that we first learn that “this thing” is a body, then that it is a body
having soul and so on (1.108.19–23). Although this is given as an example of
analysis, it does not strike me as such. Rather we posit here a concrete entity “this
thing”, a referent that is independent of meanings by which we refer to it, and
start learning new information about it.
This problem brings us to the major issue of explication vs. amplification of
knowledge. We have seen that Razī prepared his attitude towards definitions on
the basis of the paradox of analysis. That helped him show that definitions are
explications of meanings and as such do not amplify our knowledge of the
15 Abu l-Barakat also distinguishes between the “acquired“(iktisabī) and “primary“(awwalī) under-
standing. He equates the former with definitions and the latter with direct observation (Reconsidered,
1.92.16–17). One could hence argue that the primary understanding is another candidate for being the
counterpart of Razī’s and Suhrawardī’s direct observation. The problem is, however, that Abu l-Barakat
talks about maʿrifa and not about tas:awwur for both types of understanding. As we have seen that
maʿrifa for him always operates on the level of meanings, its result cannot be grasping things in them-
selves, as it was in Razī and Suhrawardī.
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essences of things. Again, at first glance, Abu l-Barakat goes in the same direc-
tion with his theory of definitions as analyses of meanings. However, if we look
at his solution to Meno’s paradox, things become more confusing.
The fact that Abu l-Barakat addresses Meno’s paradox within his discussion of
definitions and understanding is another clear sign for combining his theory with
that of Razī (the usual place to discuss Meno’s paradox would be in the “demon-
stration” section of logic.) However, Abu l-Barakat’s solution to Meno’s paradox
is diametrically opposed to that of Razī – at least at first glance. We have seen
Razī arguing against the Peripatetic “aspects solution” to Meno’s paradox. On the
contrary, this is precisely what Abu l-Barakat suggests: in order to be able to
inquire into something we must have already grasped it in some respect (min
giha) (Reconsidered, 1.88.13). One might interpret this as another case of expli-
cation: we know the subject of inquiry under a certain description with a certain
name that refers to it and we explicate the meaning through which we referred to
the subject of inquiry. This is at least what Razī made out of Abu l-Barakat’s the-
ory, as we saw in the first section. If, however, we look at Abu l-Barakat’s own
analysis, it becomes clear that he wants to explain the amplification of knowledge
and not mere explication. Here, again, he addresses his example of knowing
“human”, starting with some very general apperception of it as a body. However,
we do not explicate “body” as “human”, we do amplify our knowledge about a
certain object! No wonder that Abu l-Barakat again smuggles in “an individual”
of whom we first only conceive that it is a body, and then learn that it is a human
(Reconsidered, 1.89.9–12).
Both cases within the major issue of the explication and amplification of
knowledge show that Abu l-Barakat has an essentialist element in his theory. He
might be a sceptic or even a relativist about Aristotelian-Avicennian definitions
but he still wants us somehow to learn new information about the essences of
things in themselves when we perform scientific analysis. One might argue that
the amplification of knowledge is not a problem for Abu l-Barakat in general. As
we saw in Razī, one might still provide assents about the objects of direct percep-
tion, in the sense of “this is a body”, “this is a body having a soul”, etc. However,
one cannot say that this is our way of acquiring the definitions of humans, as
Abu Barakat does in these passages. The reason is Abu l-Barakat’s own position
that definitions are of meanings and are provided by way of explication. “This”,
however, is not an intension, that is, a way of considering the extramental object;
it is our way of referring to the object itself. On a critical reading, Abu l-Barakat
simply cannot keep his theory consistent. On a charitable reading, he tries to
accommodate both elements: we start from learning new information about con-
crete things in themselves, but we end up with intensional definitions of things
under descriptions alone. It remains a question for further study how Abu l-
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Barakat manages to slide from objects themselves to the way they appear to us
within his discussion of cognitive grasp and definition. For our purposes here, it
suffices to say that he attempts to combine both sceptical-relativist and anti-
sceptical elements in his theory.
4. Conclusion
In this article I have presented the way in which scepticism against the
Aristotelian-Avicennian theory of real essential definitions emerged from the
semantics of twelfth-century Arabic philosophy. Historically speaking, it was
probably Abu l-Barakat al-Baġdadī who prepared the way for Razī’s and
Suhrawardī’s attempts to diminish the task of Peripatetic scientific definitions. He
introduced the idea that definitions are not derived from the essences of things.
They are of things under certain descriptions, that is, the way they vaguely appear
to us. All three authors call definitions “nominal” because they only relate to the
meanings of names with which we refer to objects (intensions) and not to the
objects themselves. This epistemological theory is rooted in semantics. We saw a
theory of meaning both in Razī and in Suhrawardī, but most explicitly in Abu l-
Barakat, according to which naming and understanding stop at referentially
opaque intensions with which we refer to objects and do not extend to the
essences of objects themselves. It is due to this semantic background that Razī,
Suhrawardī and Abu l-Barakat (for the most part) think that definitions are mere
explications of intensions of terms and do not amplify our knowledge about the
essences of referents. I conceive of humans as rational animals, I explicate my
notion of “human” this way and I define it this way. If I conceived of humans as
two-footed animals, I would define them that way. Without the involvement of
any further supportive psychological or epistemological theories, it remains a
happy coincidence that I conceive of humans correctly in the first place. This pic-
ture shows how Abu l-Barakat’s semantic theory of meaning and reference pre-
pared the way for the sceptical doubts of Razī and Suhrawardī.
Besides the scepticism directed towards Aristotelian-Avicennian science, we
have also seen the anti-sceptical side of epistemology in all three authors. In each
case it bears the same character. There is a way for us, humans, to perceive
objects directly in themselves. Elsewhere I suggested that Abu l-Barakat intro-
duced a “unified direct realism” into Arabic epistemology and Razī and
Suhrawardī might have followed him in this respect (Benevich, 2020). The obser-
vations that were made in this article support this hypothesis. Whether it is
Razīan non-intentional “immediate” knowledge, or Suhrawardī’s direct observa-
tion of things “with all their specific attributes”, or Abu l-Barakat’s theory of con-
cept formation (tas:awwur) – I suggest that in all three cases we deal with the
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same anti-sceptical attempt to establish a direct and certain relation between
knowers and things. This direct relation, observation of particulars in themselves
(for sensible objects), replaces the Aristotelian-Avicennian theory of universal
knowledge through definitions and demonstrations as more certain and more
infallible to sceptical doubts. To put my hypothesis in short: knowledge is now of
particulars and not of universals.
More studies need to be done on the roots and developments of the anti-
sceptical side in this two-fold picture, but I would like to conclude with an obser-
vation about the origins of its sceptical side. The reason is that it might have been
Avicenna himself who provided Abu l-Barakat with all the arrows needed in
order to shoot down his own theory of definitions. As I recently argued, Avicenna
binds the definition of the essential with conceptual analysis: P is essential for x
iff one cannot fully conceive of x without P (Benevich, 2018; see also
Strobino, 2016). So animality is essential for humans because the concept of
human would not be full without the concept of animality (Benevich, 2018,
pp. 368–376). This is already a step in the direction of Abu l-Barakat, who wants
essentiality to operate on the level of mere meanings alone. Moreover, in his dis-
cussion of definition in Easterners, Logic (39.8; 45.1–2), Avicenna explicitly
identifies the defined quiddity as the meaning (mafhum). Of course, he also wants
to maintain that this is a real definition of a real quiddity that we are seeking
through conceptualization. Even though its qualitative content is grasped through
a given meaning, it still is the real quiddity itself. However, it remains uncertain
how Avicenna safeguards us from cases where, due to having a confused under-
standing of the real subject of definition, we mis-ascribe something as being its
essential constituent (cf. Benevich, 2018, pp. 421–426, for possible solutions).
So, Abu l-Barakat simply needs to bring this intensionalist approach to essences
to its logical conclusion, and cast doubts on how far Avicennian definitions really
reach out to the essences of things. Razī and Suhrawardī follow him in this
respect.
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